

---

# Independent Incident Assessment of the Los Rios Community College District/ Sacramento City College September 3, 2015 Shooting

---

A Report of Findings and Recommendations

*Prepared for the Los Rios Community College District*

Mike Rayfield  
Principal  
Solution Six:8  
FBI-Retired

*October 15, 2015*



# Table of Contents

---

Executive Summary.....	2
Summary of Findings.....	2
Incident Summary.....	4
General Assessment.....	8
Law Enforcement Response.....	8
Mass Emergency Notification.....	9
Response by College Personnel.....	10
Training and Emergency Preparedness.....	12
Findings and Recommendations.....	14
Incident Timeline.....	17

## Executive Summary

---

On Thursday, September 3, 2015, a shooting occurred on the campus of Sacramento City College (SCC). The shooting was not directed at the college and should not be identified as an active shooter event. The relationship to the college was that two of the subjects involved, to include the deceased, were students just departing a class that was dismissed at 3:50 PM. While on the southern edge of the college, they encountered two other subjects and an altercation quickly ensued, involving a fight, a stabbing, a shooting, a firearms death, serious injuries, and the alleged shooter at large. This event occurred in less than one minute.

The Los Rios Community College District (LRCCD) General Counsel JP Sherry, at the direction of Chancellor Brian King, requested an independent review of the September 3, 2015 incident to assess, review and make as needed recommendations relative to: timeliness and deployment of WARN (the emergency mass notification system); existing procedures including internal and external notifications, first response, evacuation, and shelter-in-place/lockdown protocols; and appropriateness of LRCCD's emergency response procedures, preparation and training. The creation of a detailed timeline was also requested by LRCCD General Counsel. This post-incident assessment was conducted by Mike Rayfield (the Assessor), a 25-year veteran of the FBI (retired) with expertise in critical incidents, violent crime investigations, and police, critical incident, tactical and active shooter response procedures.

In order to inform the Assessor's findings and recommendations, approximately 25 interviews were conducted with SCC staff, LRCCD District Office personnel and Los Rios Police Department (LRPD) Officers. Also reviewed were hundreds of pages of documents including: email and text message exchanges from involved personnel on the date of the incident, Facebook accounts, Twitter accounts, security camera footage, media footage, LRPD Dispatch records, and SCC and LRCCD emergency procedures and training records.

### Summary of Findings

The LRPD law enforcement response was appropriate, expedient, professional, and executed with a sense of purpose.

The mass emergency notification was unacceptably delayed and this delay was caused by human error and lack of practice and familiarization with the system. While unacceptable, the failure to give notice in a timely manner contributed to nothing more than uncertainty relative to this incident.

The response by college personnel was predictably chaotic, as is common in these situations; training, experience and familiarity with lockdowns and evacuations, however, created an acceptable outcome for this particular incident. This "acceptable outcome" was due in large part to the variety and availability of emergency preparedness training and planning.

The variety and availability of emergency preparedness training and planning is more than acceptable.

## **Incident Summary**

*(See Incident Timeline)*

---

At approximately 3:56 PM on Thursday, September 3, 2015, two groups of two individuals walked past each other on the south side of the SCC campus on East Road just north of Sutterville Road. It appears from video footage that words were exchanged and a fistfight began between two of the subjects. A third subject joined the fight, appearing to stab one of the individuals fighting. The fourth subject stepped up to the three fighting individuals and pulled what was presumably a handgun from his backpack and began shooting; multiple shots were fired. The subject that was shooting and the subject that was stabbed began walking away to the north. The verbal exchange, fistfight, stabbing, shooting and egress of two of the subjects occurred over a time period of 55 seconds.

Just prior to the shooting, an SCC Operations Employee working in the Operations Building witnessed the beginning of the altercation and announced that the four individuals were about to fight and someone should call the police. Another SCC Operations Employee did so and heard the shots being fired while she was on the telephone with LRPD Dispatch. LRPD Dispatch advised the SCC Operations Employee to lock the doors and get on the ground, but to stay on the phone until police arrived. A third SCC Operations Employee began locking the doors while directing bystanders to take shelter inside. Upon seeing someone outside performing CPR, she grabbed an Automated External Defibrillator (AED) and approached the injured person to see if the person providing aid wanted to use the AED. It was declined. At about the same time, this employee saw an arriving LRPD Sergeant begin administering CPR along with the assistance of an off-duty Fire Department Captain. The LRPD Sergeant requested a Code 3 response from the Fire Department for further medical assistance. The third SCC Operations Employee began attempting to direct traffic to make a lane for fire/medical personnel.

Prior to the arrival of the LRPD Sergeant, two other LRPD units with two LRPD Officers each arrived within three minutes of the end of the altercation and attempted to pursue the gunman; they had received information that two gunmen had fled onto the campus and more shots had been fired. The LRPD Sergeant arrived within forty seconds of the first arriving LRPD Officers. With the arrival of the first LRPD Officers and the LRPD Sergeant on scene performing CPR, approximately four minutes had passed since the first shots were fired.

While in pursuit of the gunmen, one of the first arriving LRPD Officers discovered a stabbing victim near the smoking tent to the north west of the SCC Operations Building; the LRPD Officer began administering first aid and requested medical assistance from the Fire Department. The stabbing victim was transported to the hospital at approximately 4:13 PM.

At approximately 4:04 PM the LRPD Chief of Police (Chief), using correct protocols, requested the Associate Vice Chancellor of Communications and Media Relations (AVC Comm.) to ask the SCC Public Information Officer (PIO) to send a mass emergency notification via the WARN

system to everyone at SCC advising there had been a shooting on the SCC campus and all should shelter in place. (*"Students and Staff: SCC main campus currently locked down due to gunshots fired. Shelter in place until further notice"*). The AVC Comm. immediately attempted to instruct the SCC PIO to issue the alert, but was unable to reach him by office or cell phone.

Within this 4:04 PM time frame, the Sacramento Police Department (SPD) arrived on scene. Shortly after requesting the WARN notification, the LRPD Chief overheard SPD Radio Traffic indicating the shooter had fled the SCC campus. The LRPD Chief was fairly confident at that point that the gunman was no longer on campus.

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between LRPD and SPD, this incident, because it was a homicide, came under the primary command of SPD.

The AVC Comm. sent an email to DO Chancellor's Exec. Staff/cc: PIO-all: (*"Chief [sic] has called for a WARN notice to go out, shelter in place"*). A follow-up email less than a minute later went to the same groups with the same information with the additional: (*"...2 armed black males on campus; two victims."*). The AVC Comm. followed this with a cut-and-paste of the message to the District Facebook page, which is set up to automatically create a Twitter feed.

At approximately 4:13 PM, the SCC PIO returned the call to the AVC Comm. and he was instructed to issue the WARN notification. At approximately 4:16 PM, the SCC PIO informed AVC Comm. that he was having trouble logging on to the WARN system. The AVC Comm. requested two others (the LRCCD Risk Management Supervisor and the Cosumnes River College [CRC] PIO) to call and assist the SCC PIO. Those others were unable to reach the SCC PIO. At 4:17 PM, the American River College (ARC) PIO was contacted by the AVC Comm. and his assistance was requested. Within the same minute he was able to log onto the WARN system, but the system did not allow him to send a message on behalf of another college and he was not able to reach the SCC PIO by phone.

At approximately 4:18 PM, an SCC Public Relations Technician, unable to reach SCC departments by phone (no answer) as instructed by SCC President, took the initiative and sent an email to SCC-Everyone on Exchange: (*"The SCC main campus is on lockdown. All staff members and instructors-close and lock your office and classroom doors until further notice."*).

The SCC PIO made two attempts to contact WARN Support/Customer Service and during his second attempt, WARN Support called him back and he requested assistance in sending out the WARN notification. At approximately 4:27 PM, WARN Support logged onto the WARN system to begin the process of drafting and sending the WARN notification.

During this time period, in spite of the absence of a WARN notification, the combination of email, text messages, phone calls and social networking allowed the staff of SCC to become aware of the situation and immediately begin advising students and others, as well as unilaterally begin instructing students and instructors to lock down and/or evacuate. Several staff from the SCC President's office, to include the President herself and the Vice President of

Student Services (VP of Student Services), assisted with directing the lockdown and eventual evacuation. The attempt to communicate efficiently was complicated by the fact that the students did not know what was going on because no one had yet received a WARN notification. The SCC President and others were slowed down in their efforts to execute a lockdown by students wanting more information. In the aftermath, several instructors noted they were unable to lock their doors for lack of keys and several noted their doors could only be locked from the outside. The evacuation effort was eventually assisted by law enforcement.

An LRPD Sergeant and LRPD Officer/PIO arrived on campus at approximately 4:30 PM and, through conversations with SPD, believed the gunman was no longer on campus. The LRPD PIO posted the following on the LRPD Facebook page: (*"The SCC campus is sheltering in place regarding a weapons call on campus. Please avoid the area and stay away from surrounding roadways to assist emergency personnel response. We appreciate your cooperation"*).

SPD requested that the SCC Operations Building be used as the Command Post (CP). SCC would have normally used this structure for their Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as it is setup for that purpose, but there was some thought that the secondary location/alternate EOC should be utilized due to the Operations Building's proximity to the crime scene. The Operations Building became a combined CP/EOC, which was not a traditional crisis management setup, as these entities are usually physically separated. In this case, according to the LRPD Chief, it was not critical as there was no continuing crisis because it appeared the gunman had fled the campus within minutes of the shooting and the immediate scene was secure.

The clearing of the college buildings by LRPD began at 4:35 PM. LRPD requested and received assistance from SPD with clearing the inner and outer perimeter of the college. An LRPD Officer noted that in many cases he found locked doors, pulled window coverings and staff and students on the floor and under desks. Another LRPD Officer noted that it seemed half of the college was on lockdown and half was conducting business as usual. During clearing operations it was discovered that several high school-aged children were using the pool. SCC VP of Student Services, under police escort, assisted with their evacuation at approximately 6:00 PM.

The WARN notification was sent by WARN Support at 4:40 PM. 90% of recipients received the WARN notification within five minutes. As it was sent by WARN Support, several default groups did not receive the alert; WARN Support does not have preset templates. Generally, the notification was sent to 23,235 SCC students and staff. 107 personnel from the preset templates did not receive the notification. The preset templates are for the emergency responders and facilities management personnel.

At 4:40 PM, the SCC Public Relations Technician sent an email to SCC-Everyone on Exchange: (*"Campus Police is working with SPD to investigate and clear each building on campus. Please remain on lockdown until further notice."*). SCC staff continued to aggressively communicate and direct lockdown and some evacuations.

LRPD Incident Commander (IC)/Sergeant communicated at 5:18 PM he would like Media to stage in “Lot C” at Hughes Stadium. At 5:21 PM, an LRPD Captain advised the LRPD Sergeant that Media was to stage at the Burgess Brothers Burgers across from SCC on Sutterville Road, per direction of the SPD PIO.

Two hours and 16 minutes after the start of the altercation, LRPD advised that all college buildings were clear (6:12 PM); LRPD continued to patrol SCC grounds after the completion of the evacuation and SPD held the outer perimeter until it was moved primarily to protect the crime scene.

At approximately 7:19 PM, SCC issued the all clear for the college and at 7:35 PM, the SCC PIO sent a WARN notification announcing: (*“SCC EMERGENCY: Students and staff, the main campus lock down is over, and an all clear notice has been issued. Classes resume as normal on Friday, Sept. 4. Thank-you for your patience.”*). Only the 107 personnel from the default group/preset templates (emergency responders and facilities management personnel) received this notification.

At approximately 9:00 PM, Sutterville Road reopened, but the crime scene remained active relative to SPD Crime Scene Investigators. The Coroner arrived at approximately 10:30 PM and the body of the deceased was removed at approximately 11:00 PM, with clean-up of the crime scene conducted by a private contractor beginning at 11:48 PM.

The breakdown of the perimeter and the official end of the incident occurred at 12:05 AM Friday, September 4, 2015—eight hours and 12 minutes after the first shots were fired.

## General Assessment

---

### Law Enforcement Response

The first responders, LRPD, were on scene in just under a commendable four minutes. Realizing the scene was not secure and gunmen may have fled onto campus they immediately pursued the priority threat: a shooter(s) on campus. Not knowing at this point if this was targeted violence or an active shooter situation, the first two responding LRPD units with two LRPD Officers each made the correct decision to prioritize locating threat(s) over rendering aid to the shooting victim. Within the same minute a third LRPD unit arrived, an LRPD Sergeant, and upon realizing that four LRPD Officers were searching for the shooter, he rendered aid to the victim in what would be considered a “warm zone,” or an unsecured scene with no immediate threat. This was also a correct decision, and he should be commended.

LRPD and SPD quickly secured the immediate crime scene and set up CP. This was established within sight of the crime scene and the deceased. This was not the first choice of LRPD, however, at this point as it was a homicide investigation and through MOU, SPD took over command and this was their decision. LRPD and SCC EOC, through emergency planning and preparedness, had an alternate EOC available for use, but it was not utilized, per SPD direction.

LRPD and SPD began college-clearing operations within 39 minutes of the shooting, a testament to good organization and decisive leadership. The college was clear and largely evacuated within two hours and 15 minutes of the start of this incident. Through interviews, email and social networking, the impression of the actions of LRPD were mostly positive relative to their efficiency and professionalism:

*“LRPD was on scene within a minute of the shooting, he is of the opinion they did a ‘great job.’”*

*“...the response to the shooting on campus was handled very well and she has a high level of confidence in LRPD.”*

*“Relative to this incident she believes LRPD couldn’t have done a better job; ‘they were quick, professional and did a great job.’”*

The LRPD law enforcement response was appropriate, expedient, professional, and executed with a sense of purpose.

## Mass Emergency Notification

Within four minutes of the shooting, the LRPD Chief made the decision to issue a mass emergency notification through WARN, the system used by the LRCCD. By protocol, the LRPD Chief has the authority to do this. As previously noted, the notification was to read: (*“Students and Staff: SCC main campus currently locked down due to gunshots fired. Shelter in place until further notice.”*). Several personnel within the District Office have the ability to send a WARN notification once authorized to do so. The LRPD Chief requested that the AVC Comm. direct the SCC PIO to send out the WARN notification.

Unacceptably, the notification was not sent until 4:40 PM. The SCC PIO encountered difficulty with logging on; he noted that he could not remember the “decoy letters” on the logon code. Several calls were made by the AVC Comm. to assist and attempt to rectify this situation. The SCC PIO finally called WARN Support to send the notification and it appears that process took about 13 minutes.

The AVC Comm. did not take the initiative to send the notification or ask someone else in the District Office to send it once it became obvious there was considerable delay, especially between the time he received the call from the LRPD Chief and when he was able to contact the SCC PIO. The AVC Comm. explained this was due to him having too many other duties and not being efficient with the system. He further described the WARN system as cumbersome.

Along with the ability and authorization to use an emergency mass notification system like WARN comes the responsibility to stay current, practiced and maintain the ability to use it under pressure and without delay. During this assessment, a District employee demonstrated the use of the system from logging on up to the point where she would actually send a notification. During the first demonstration, questions were asked as a way of distracting her and causing some general confusion. The notification was ready to send in under three minutes. During the next demonstration, she executed the notification with no interruptions and it was ready to send within one minute. For the purpose of this assessment, the WARN system is capable of sending a notification within one minute.

It appears training on the WARN system is offered regularly and the LRCCD WARN Coordinator (LRCCD Risk Management Supervisor) has made it clear she is available for individualized training.

The Assessor spoke with other colleges and universities. At those institutions, the actual sending of the notification is a police dispatch function and/or a function of campus public safety. In most cases, higher levels of authority draft the message and authorize the use of the system, but the sending of the emergency message falls to those experienced with sending emergency communications in stressful situations.

In no case at the other institutions was it revealed that the sending of emergency notifications was the responsibility of a PIO. It was found they often access and use the mass notification

systems for urgent, but non-emergency situations. It should be noted that two four-year universities were contacted and while they had greater resources overall, they did not have a greater number of dispatchers on duty than LRCCD.

The mass emergency notification was unacceptably delayed and this delay was caused by human error and lack of practice and familiarization with the system. While unacceptable, the failure to give notice in a timely manner contributed to nothing more than uncertainty relative to this incident.

### Response by College Personnel

In spite of the late WARN notification to the SCC campus, SCC and District personnel utilized email, text messaging, social media and telephone calls to announce the lock down with exponential effect. While this event was never designated an “active shooter,” many responded, absent more information, as if it were a worst case scenario. On-site SCC personnel from the President on down acted courageously and decisively, actively pushing students and staff into rooms and buildings and announcing the need to shelter in place. This was somewhat complicated by the lack of the WARN notification as staff had to explain many times why the lockdown was occurring, delaying the process.

It appears there were issues with doors that would not lock, doors for which staff had no keys and doors that could only be locked from the outside, and students who could not get into already locked doors.

A cursory physical survey of the campus revealed a variety of door hardware: push button locks with key holes on the opposite side, key locks only, traditional doorknobs and more contemporary lever action door handles with the ability to lock only from the outside. Some doors from the “outside” are outward opening and others are inward opening.

From interviews and accounts of the first two hours after the shooting, it is obvious that many staff have had training relative to these events to include specific active shooter training relative to the “Run, Hide, Fight” concept; they knew what to do and they demonstrated a high level of situational awareness. Even the well-trained and practiced will experience some level of chaos and confusion, as was noted by some of those interviewed:

*“...immediately began giving directions to those in the quad area directing them to the cafeteria all the while staying in contact with other administrators via phone and text. He was also advising of his location and activity. He communicated with SCC President...”*

*“...stayed in the quad area until he was advised by President Jeffery that it was clear to evacuate. He went to the cafeteria and began giving evacuation directions towards 12<sup>th</sup> Ave. and Freeport Blvd...also assisted at the Bookstore, Gym, and Cal Works...also discovered there were High School Kids at the pool with Chaperones. Realizing their parents would be unable to*

*get on to the campus to pick them up, he asked and received direction from law enforcement as to how to proceed.”*

*“...noted that several other staff members, per Action Coordinators for Emergency Survival (A.C.E.S.) training were directing lockdowns/shelter in place at their assigned location throughout the incident...believes most staff learned of the incident through texting, social media and various communications with other staff and students.”*

*“...is of the opinion that there was a lot of confusion in the aftermath and a lot of info didn’t get out. He received the WARN notice to shelter in place at approximately 4:44 PM. Doesn’t recall receiving an ‘all on exchange’ email providing the same information and added he really wasn’t communicating much with anyone throughout the incident.”*

*“He also believes he saw no panic because of training and awareness both on the part of staff and students. He noted that most of the students seemed fairly ‘casual’ about the event.”*

*“Since she wasn’t aware of the security situation when she started assisting with evacuation and lockdown she questioned her judgement relative to not being locked down herself. She described the effort as not organized, ad hoc, chaotic and low tech, ‘like herding cats.’ She believes Deans and Instructors felt in control of their respective areas, but in an information void. She also later heard of students trying to get shelter, but couldn’t get into locked classrooms and of classrooms that couldn’t be locked due to lack of keys, etc.”*

*“She immediately pulled the pins from the push bars on the doors causing them to lock from the outside...told everybody to get down. She saw [Operations employee] on the phone and under a desk. Others were pulling people inside.”*

*“...noted that in many cases he found locked doors, pulled window coverings and staff and students on the floor and under desks.”*

*“At about 4:13 PM...had not received any direction and took it upon herself to start calling people from her contact list and advising them of the situation. She had only overheard info about a lockdown, but wasn’t aware it was actually confirmed.”*

The response by college personnel was predictably chaotic, as is common in these situations; training, experience and familiarity with lockdowns and evacuations, however, created an acceptable outcome for this particular incident. This “acceptable outcome” was due in large part to the variety and availability of emergency preparedness training and planning.

## Training and Emergency Preparedness

Part of this knowledgeable “ad hoc” response is due in large part to training and the world we live in. The term “active shooter” has been part of our vocabulary since about 1999, coined post-Columbine where tactics and response changed dramatically.

While examining training available and presented within LRCCD and at SCC, it was learned that unless one is member of a specific response team—C-CERT, ACES, EOC, etc.—the training is not mandatory.

During the period from 2013 through August 20, 2015, LRPD has offered no fewer than 57 training sessions covering topics such as active shooter (which comprised 14 of those trainings), AED/CPR, evacuation drills, C-CERT, campus safety, verbal de-escalation, ACES, WARN alert info and others. It is assessed that training is available for those who wish to participate and be responsible for the safety and survival of themselves and others during a critical situation. As this is written it was learned that during a recent active shooter training session offered by the LRPD, four persons attended.

A review of LRCCD/SCC emergency preparedness included the aforementioned interviews as well as a review of the following:

- Los Rios Alert Activation Guide
- Emergency Procedures Brochure (publicly posted)
- District Office and Facilities Management Immediate Action and Event Specific Checklists
- District Office and Facilities Management EOC Guidebook and Section Checklists (V.2)
- SCC Emergency Procedures and EOC Checklist Binder
- LRCCD Training Records
- ARC Safe Campus Action Plan
- 2015 FLC Letter from the FLC President relative to safety, security and training
- Action Steps for Students of Concern-FLC Main (*Threat Assessment Team*)
- 2014 CPTED Reports

The newest version of the Emergency Procedures Brochure/Flipchart (publicly posted) checklists and instructions are specific, comprehensive and valuable. The Assessor understands that LRCCD is in the process of posting the newest version of the flipchart throughout the colleges of LRCCD.

The District Office and Facilities Management Immediate Action and Event Specific Checklists (and the College versions) (Tab B) tries to cover a lot of territory with the header: “CRISIS SITUATION: ACTS OF VIOLENCE, SHOOTING, REPORT OF WEAPON(S) AT THE DISTRICT OFFICES, FACILITIES MANAGEMENT OR ON A COLLEGE CAMPUS, ATTACK, OR DISTURBANCE BY CRIMINAL OR INSANE PERSON.”

It is assessed that this document needs to address “active shooter” as a separate category with specific instructions relative to that event.

The variety and availability of emergency preparedness training and planning is more than acceptable.

## Findings and Recommendations

Findings	Recommendations
<p>Initial LRPD response was appropriate if not expedient. The first two responding units were tactically appropriate in prioritizing the pursuit of the potential shooter over providing aid to the injured.</p>	<p>-Continue to receive, update and drill active shooter training.</p>
<p>Third arriving LRPD unit, a Sergeant, provided CPR to shooting victim while attempting to control the immediate scene.</p>	<p>-He should be commended.</p>
<p>The decision to send a WARN notification was made within four minutes of the shooting.</p>	<p>-None.</p>
<p>The WARN notification was inexcusably delayed nearly 36 minutes after the instructions were given to send. The SCC PIO was unable to remember the “decoy letters” within the logon code and the AVC Comm. did not directly and expeditiously intervene and/or direct District Office personnel with familiarization with the system to send the notification.</p> <p>Had this been an active shooter event, the result could have been catastrophic. Those given the responsibility to send did not consider expedient alternatives.</p> <p>WARN Support sent out the alert, but did not or could not send to the 107 personnel on the default group/preset templates.</p> <p>When the all clear was sent by the SCC PIO at 7:35 PM, only the 107 in the default group were included and not the majority of SCC students and staff.</p>	<p>-Emergency WARN alerts must be sent out without delay and with a sense of urgency.</p> <p>-While training appears available and sufficient, ability to use on a moment’s notice should be drilled.</p> <p>-Consider attaching this responsibility, training, training attendance, and competency with the WARN system as part of performance reviews and evaluation.</p> <p>-Temporarily, quarterly drilling is recommended for those less adept at system use.</p> <p>-Run WARN drills under created stress.</p>

<p>The AVC Comm. and PIOs have primary responsibility for sending emergency notifications.</p>	<p>-Consider whether this should be a PIO function.</p> <p>-Consider giving the sending function to LRPD Dispatchers and LRPD Sergeants. This puts the responsibility into the hands of 24/7 emergency service providers. This is not to exclude others that already have access.</p>
<p>WARN is the primary emergency notification system.</p>	<p>-Determine if this system continues to meet the needs of LRCCD colleges in terms of design and functionality.</p>
<p>WARN is an “opt-in” system for registering students.</p>	<p>-Consider establishing the mass communication system as “opt-out” to potentially obtain more subscribers.</p>
<p>WARN sends notifications via text, email and voice message. It is possible students and teachers on campus and/or in class would not have short-term access to these resources.</p>	<p>-Consider a system with a public address system alert for immediate full notification.</p> <p>-Consider a system that would flash the alert on college electronic marquees.</p> <p>-Consider a system that would flash the alert on any computer logged in to the college/District network as well as notify institutional Facebook and Twitter accounts.</p>
<p>The initial response (non-law enforcement) at the college was predictably chaotic, but acceptable under the circumstances. Many staff members responded accordingly in spite of the lack of centralized direction and notification.</p>	<p>-Reinforce this positive performance and continue to train through scenario-based exercises and review after-action reports from this incident to learn from “best practices.”</p>

<p>Several instructors/staff members were unable to lock their doors for lack of a key.</p>	<p>-Instructors/staff should have keys for the classrooms they utilize.</p> <p>-Realizing the potential cost, door hardware locks should be consistent.</p> <p>-A quick economical fix for a door that opens into a room would be readily available door wedges.</p> <p>-In addition to room keys, building keys should be assigned where most prudent.</p> <p>“If one door is not locked soon enough because a single employee is unable to lockdown, mass casualties can occur. It is important to allow staff the tools they need to keep the building secure throughout the school day. And staff should be given ample practice in physically performing lockdown procedures before a crisis.”  <i>-Campus Safety Magazine 01/08/2013</i></p>
<p>Concern that after door is locked someone may seek refuge.</p>	<p>-This is a common concern. An active shooter situation is unique and unfortunately it will be a judgment call by those in the room.</p>
<p>Emergency response training is not mandatory for staff not part of one of the emergency response teams.</p>	<p>-Consider inserting this training during other mandatory training sessions.</p>
<p>Emergency response manuals do not clearly delineate the unique response required for an active shooter event.</p>	<p>-Clearly detail an active shooter response and strategies in LRCCD emergency response documents.</p>

## Incident Timeline

---

### Source Codes

CAD LRPD Dispatch  
EM Email  
FB Facebook  
IN Interview  
PD LRPD Report  
PL Phone Log  
VID Security camera video  
WARN WARN Log

### Timeline

*Note: all times are PM unless noted otherwise.*

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
3:55:40	Four subjects; two groups of two first encounter each other and <i>appear</i> to have words.	VID; IN
3:56:15	Two subjects begin fighting; <i>appears</i> that third subject is stabbing one of the fighters.	VID
	SCC Operations personnel call LRPD Dispatch; shots fired during call.	IN (CAD shows 3:59)
3:56:28	Fourth subject <i>appears</i> to begin shooting.	VID
3:56:35	The fourth subject who appeared to be shooting and the subject that appeared to be getting stabbed walk away to the north on East Road.	VID
3:58	LRPD Chief advises Assistant to Vice Chancellor of Finance and Administration, on behalf of the Vice Chancellor of Finance and Administration (VC Admin.), of shots fired at SCC Operations area.	IN; PL

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
3:59	LRPD Sergeant #1 requests all available units respond to area of shooting Code 3. Fire Department is dispatched to Operations Building at SCC.	CAD; IN
3:59-4:03	LRPD Chief calls AVC Comm.; requests WARN notification for SCC: (“Shooting on Campus-Shelter in Place.”) This is a +/- 4-minute call as LRPD Chief had to wait 2-3 minutes for the AVC Comm. to come to the phone.	IN; PL
4:00:02	First LRPD unit with two LRPD Officers arrives on scene.	VID
4:00:11	Same LRPD unit departs to the east on Sutterville Road.	VID
4:00:15	Second LRPD unit with two LRPD Officers arrives on scene and immediately departs to the north on East Road.	VID
4:00:42	LRPD Sergeant #2 arrives on scene and takes over CPR from subject conducting CPR. Assisted by off-duty Fire Captain.	IN; VID
4:01	LRPD Chief advises VC Admin. of details regarding description of victims/ongoing CPR. SCC President is advised of possible shooting on campus.	IN; PL
4:04	AVC Comm. attempts to call SCC PIO twice, once on his office phone and again on his cell phone, and does not get an answer. (Attempts and connect all occur within the 4:04-4:05 time frame).	IN; PL
	LRPD Chief hears SPD Radio Traffic indicating the shooter has fled the SCC campus. LRPD Chief feels fairly confident this information is accurate and the shooter is no longer on campus.	IN
4:04:28	Two patrol units from SPD arrive on scene.	VID
4:04-4:08	SCC President directs moving students into classrooms and locking down; she personally assists in evacuating the “quad” area of the campus.	IN

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
4:07	Ambulance is on standby behind SCC Learning Resource Center.	CAD
4:09:38	AVC Comm. sends email to DO Chancellor's Exec. Staff/CC: PIO-ALL: ( <i>"[LRPD Chief] has called for a WARN Notice to go out, shelter in place"</i> ).	EM; IN
4:10	AVC Comm. sends email to DO Chancellor's Exec. Staff/CC: PIO-ALL: ( <i>"[LRPD Chief] has called for a WARN Notice to go out, shelter in place. additional 2 armed black males on SCC Campus; two victims."</i> ).	EM
	LRPD Sergeant #1 reports perimeter being set near Operations Building.	CAD
4:13	SCC PIO returns AVC Comm. 4:04-4:05 calls, receives instructions to send out WARN notification.	IN; PL
	Stabbing victim is transported to UC Davis.	PD
4:15:40	SCC PIO calls AVC Comm. and advises he having trouble accessing the WARN system.	PL; IN
4:16	AVC Comm. contacts the LRCCD Risk Management Supervisor to request she assist SCC PIO with WARN notification.	IN; PL
4:16 (+/-)	AVC Comm. attempts to contact CRC PIO to assist SCC PIO. He is unable to reach her.	IN; (PL inconclusive on time)
	LRPD Chief advises VC Admin. of one deceased.	IN; PL
4:17	AVC Comm. contacts ARC PIO to request he assist SCC PIO with WARN notification.	IN; PL
	ARC PIO logs onto WARN.	WARN

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
4:18	SCC Public Relations Technician sends an email to SCC-Everyone on Exchange: ( <i>"The SCC main campus is on lockdown. All staff members and instructors-close and lock your office and classroom doors until further notice."</i> ).	EM; IN
4:18:40	ARC PIO makes unsuccessful attempt to contact SCC PIO.	PL
4:19	SCC PIO Twice attempts to contact WARN Support/Customer Service to request assistance with sending out notification. There is no answer both times. While attempting second call, they call him, and the request for assistance begins.	PL; IN
4:19:02	AVC Comm. sends email to DO-Chancellor's Exec Staff: ( <i>"one victim deceased; confirmed as student"</i> ).	EM; IN
4:22	AVC Comm. sends email to DO-Chancellor's Exec Staff: ( <i>"identifies a victim as a deceased student." (FB link attached)</i> ).	EM
4:26	LRPD Sergeant #2 confirms college is on lockdown.	PD
4:27	WARN Support logs onto system.	WARN
4:28:42	LRCCD Risk Management Supervisor makes unsuccessful attempt to contact SCC PIO.	IN; PL
4:30 (+/-)	LRPD Sergeant #1 is designated as IC as he was watch commander for the day. Due to the homicide, this will be an SPD crime scene. LRPD PIO Officer #1 also arrives on scene. Both LRPD Sergeant #1 and LRPD Officer #1 say the gunman is no longer on campus.	IN; PD
	LRPD PIO #1 puts out an alert on the LRPD Facebook page: ( <i>"The SCC campus is sheltering in place regarding a weapons call on campus. Please avoid the area and stay away from surrounding roadways to assist emergency personnel response. We appreciate your cooperation."</i> ).	FB; IN

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
4:30:11	LRCCD Risk Management Supervisor sends email to SCC PIO and ARC PIO letting them know she is available to assist.	IN; EM
4:31	LRPD Sergeant #1 reports CP will be set at the Operations Building. CP site selection is the decision of SPD.	CAD; IN
4:33	LRPD Officer #2 reports north end of the college is clear.	CAD
4:35-4:37	LRPD begins to clear college buildings. Instructions to evacuate to north side of the college.	CAD; IN
4:40	WARN notification is sent by WARN Support. 107 personnel in the default groups do not receive notification.	EM; IN; WARN
4:40 (+/-)	LRPD Chief arrives at SCC.	IN
4:40:33	SCC Public Relations Technician sends an email to SCC-Everyone on Exchange: ( <i>"Campus Police is working with SPD to investigate and clear each building on campus. Please remain on lockdown until further notice."</i> ).	EM; IN
4:46	SPD begins to assist with clearing operations of inner campus grounds and perimeter.	IN; PD
5:18	LRPD Sergeant #1 advises that Media should stage in "Lot C" in front of Hughes Stadium.	CAD; IN; PD
5:21	LRPD SCC Captain advises LRPD Sergeant #1, per direction of SPD PIO, to have Media stage at Burgess Brothers Burgers across the street from the crime scene on Sutterville Road.	IN; PD
5:22	LRPD Sergeant #1 advises media will stage at Burgess Brothers Burgers.	CAD
5:25	Number of victims confirmed as three.	PD

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
5:26	Stabbing victim found earlier near smoking tent is identified.	IN; PD
5:39	AVC Comm. contacts LRPD Dispatch and requests names of victims. LRPD Dispatch advises they cannot release that information as it is an active SPD investigation and only SPD can release the identities of the victims.	CAD
6:02	SCC VP of Student Services, under police escort, evacuates high school children from SCC pool to Freeport Boulevard.	IN; PD
6:12	LRPD determines all college buildings are clear. They continue to patrol the college while SPD holds the college perimeter.	IN; PD
7:19:35	All clear issued by SCC.	PD; CAD
7:35	SCC PIO sends "all clear" WARN notification: ( <i>"SCC EMERGENCY: Students and staff, the main campus lock down is over, and an all clear notice has been issued. Classes resume as normal on Friday, Sept. 4. Thank-you for your patience."</i> ). Only the 107 personnel in default groups receive the all clear message. SCC students and staff do not.	IN; WARN
	SPD discontinues patrol of outer perimeter and moves resources in, to continue to protect crime scene.	CAD; IN
9:00 (+/-)	Sutterville Road reopens.	IN
9:14	SPD requests all media releases be vetted through them due to SCC/LRCCD releases of sensitive information relative to the homicide. This comes from SPD Chief to SPD PIO. LRPD Officer #1 advises LRPD Chief, who advises AVC Comm.	IN
10:27	Coroner is on scene.	CAD

<b>Time</b>	<b>Event</b>	<b>Source Code</b>
11:00	Coroner departs.	CAD
	Body is removed.	CAD
11:48	Private crime scene clean-up company on scene.	IN; PD
12 Midnight	SCC perimeter LRPD Officers depart.	CAD; PD
12:05 AM (09/04/2015)	Incident/crime scene operations complete.	CAD; PD

END TIMELINE

Respectfully submitted, -



Mike Rayfield  
Principal  
Solution Six:8

10.15.2015  
Date